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Abstract 
 
R&D plays a dual role: First, it generates new knowledge and second, 
it develops a firm's absorptive capacity. Most of the existing strategic 
investment game models neglect, however, the second role of R&D. 
The aim of this paper is to incorporate the absorptive capacity 
hypothesis in such a model by endogenizing the spillover. A two-stage 
game is established and subsequently solved, looking for the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria. Considering the comparative static properties 
of the model as well as the simulation results, a new effect appears: 
The "free-rider effect" of the models with exogenous spillover, which 
deteriorates the higher the spillover becomes, is now counteracted by 
the "absorptive capacity effect". It is found that firms will invest more 
in R&D to strengthen absorptive capacity when the spillover 
parameter is higher. 
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1 Introduction
Firms carrying out R&D contribute to the production of new knowledge. Knowl-
edge, in turn, has some character of a public good. It is nonrival (its use by
one firm does not limit its use by others) and it shows some degree of non-
excludability (the owner cannot prevent others from using it) depending on
the nature of the specific knowledge and the legal system to protect property
rights. Due to the public good character, externalities arise in the production
of knowledge, which are referred to as knowledge or R&D spillovers. Cohen and
Levinthal (1989) define knowledge spillovers as including "any original, valuable
knowledge generated in the research process which becomes publicly accessible".
It should be emphasized that spillovers only refer to the useful (valuable) part
of the knowledge that escapes. Thus, in the presence of spillovers, part of the
knowledge generated by a firm leaks out and might be used by its competitors.
The producer of the specific knowledge is not the only one that benefits from it.
Empirical evidence confirms the presence of R&D spillovers, although the
empirical assessment of the extent of spillovers causes a lot of problems. These
difficulties range from measurement issues over a lack of available data to econo-
metric problems such as multicollinearity and simultaneity. A more thorough
discussion on the methods, problems, and results of empirical studies on R&D
spillovers is to be found in Griliches (1995, 1994, 1992, 1979, 1958). Never-
theless, Griliches (1992) concludes that ”in spite of all these difficulties, there
has been a significant number of reasonably well done studies all pointing in
the same direction: R&D spillovers are present, their magnitude may be quite
large, and social rates of return remain significantly above private rates”. In-
tellectual property right regulations do not prevent the outflow of knowledge.
Patents, for example, also disclose information and make ”inventing around”
possible. Imitation times are often very short. Mansfield et al. (1981) found in
an empirical study of 48 major product innovations in the US that 60% of the
patented successful innovations were imitated within 4 years. The effectiveness
of intellectual property right regulations in protecting new knowledge is limited.
Strategic investment game models examine the effects of R&D spillovers.
The result that the non-cooperative equilibrium amount of R&D is decreasing
as the value of the spillover parameter rises was first shown by Spence (1984).
Consequently, firms participating in a strategic investment game have an in-
sufficient incentive to invest in R&D, especially when spillovers are high. The
resulting under-investment in R&D would be a typical situation demanding
public intervention. Mainly three policy measures can be employed to restore
firms’ incentives to conduct R&D. These are first, legal provisions with regard
to intellectual property right and antitrust issues, second, R&D subsidies, and
finally, stimulation of R&D cooperation (for a discussion of the advantages and
problems of these policies see Katz (1986)). Since the mid 1980s the focus of re-
search and government policy is on the encouragement of research joint ventures
(RJVs).
The two most influential strategic investment game models dealing with the
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effects of R&D cooperation are the one by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988,
1990), henceforth denoted as AJ, and that by Kamien et al. (1992), henceforth
denoted as KMZ. In both models it is assumed that the unit-cost of production
for a specific good may be reduced by investing in R&D. The fact that some
benefits of each firm’s R&D flow without payment to other firms is accounted for
in both models by the introduction of a spillover parameter, which is exogenously
given to the firms.
The assumption of an exogenously given spillover parameter neglects, how-
ever, the role of R&D in promoting a firm’s absorptive capacity, i.e. a firm’s
ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment. Em-
pirical evidence (provided by Jaffe (1986), Harhoff (2000) or Cockburn and
Henderson (1998) for the pharmaceutical industry) shows that a firm cannot
profit from the knowledge of its competitor regardless how much research it
carries out. Yet, most of the strategic investment games do not accommodate
the second role of R&D as a promoter of absorptive capacity. The ”traditional”
models such as those by AJ and KMZ, suffer from the assumption that a firm
can gain knowledge from its competitors without performing own research, a
supposition which is termed ”manna-from-heaven” assumption by Kamien and
Zang (2000).
Despite the empirical evidence on the validity of the absorptive capacity
hypothesis, models that pursue the abolishment of this unrealistic assumption
by incorporating an endogenous spillover are still scarce. The article by Kamien
and Zang (2000) is the most famous contribution to that aim. Furthermore,
the models by Grünfeld (2003), Kaiser (2002) and Wiethaus (2005) belong to
this strand of literature. However, in none of the aforementioned models it is
distinguished between different components of R&D.
Hence in the present paper, a symmetric two-stage Cournot-duopoly model
is set up, where firms have to decide how much to spend on two different types
of R&D at the first stage. At the second stage of the game firms compete à la
Cournot. The model basically builds on the KMZ framework, but it accounts for
the fact that firms cannot gain knowledge from their competitors unconditional
on how much research they perform. The unrealistic ”manna-from-heaven”
assumption is eliminated in this model by treating a firm’s absorptive capacity
as a function of its commitment to R&D. As mentioned before, this is in contrast
to most of the existing studies where the extent to which firms can absorb
knowledge from the environment is assumed to be exogenously determined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The strategic investment game
model is described in Section 2. In Section 3, the equilibrium conditions are
worked out, followed by a comparative static analysis. A simulation example
is presented in Section 4 and conclusions are drawn in Section 5. For better
reading, the proofs are given in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
Assume that there are two identical firms (i and j) in a market. The firms
produce the same product and face a linear inverse demand function
D−1(Q) = 1−Q (1)
with Q = qi + qj , qi denoting the output of the respective firm and Q referring
to the total output.
Initially both firms are characterized by the same constant unit-cost of pro-
duction c, which may be reduced by investing in R&D. However, two different
types of R&D are distinguished. This classification of R&D expenditures reflects
a firm’s trade-off between carrying out own research, subsequently leading to
innovations, and imitating rivals’ successful innovations. Accordingly, a firm’s
R&D budget is split into a part devoted to the improvement of absorptive capac-
ity and another part directed at producing original results. The enhancement
of a firm’s absorptive capacity enables it to gain more from the other firm’s re-
search. It is implicitly assumed that the capability of a firm to imitate successful
innovations is different from the ability to innovate on its own. Therefore, firm
i’s total R&D expenditure (xi) is composed of R&D that improves its absorptive
capacity (xai ) and R&D aiming at the production of original results (x
o
i ).
xi ≡ xai + xoi i = 1, 2 (2)
Concerning absorptive capacity, a few assumptions have to be introduced.
First of all, it is hypothesized that a company needs to make its own efforts
in order to build up its ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge
from the environment. This is the distinctive feature of the model on hand.
As mentioned before, most of the existing strategic investment game models
assume that a firm can absorb any of the externally available knowledge. In the
present model it is supposed, however, that firm i’s absorptive capacity (γi) is
a function of its research devoted to strengthening absorptive capacity.
γi = γ(xai ) i = 1, 2 (3)
It is assumed that the more a firm invests in strengthening its absorptive ca-
pacity, the higher it will be, i.e. γ0(xai ) > 0 for all x
a
i ≥ 0. However, absorptive
capacity increases at a decreasing rate, i.e. γ00(xai ) < 0 for all x
a
i ≥ 0. Conse-
quently, it is required that the function γ(.) is twice continuously differentiable,
increasing and strictly concave. Furthermore, a firm’s absorptive capacity takes
a value between zero and one. If a firm does not invest in building up receiver
competence at all, its absorptive capacity is zero, i.e. γ(0) = 0. As a con-
sequence, the firm cannot gain anything from externally available knowledge.
The more a firm spends on improving absorptive capacity, the closer it gets to
perfect appropriability. A firm’s receiver competence would be equal to one, if
it could absorb all of the knowledge leaking out from other sources. It is sup-
posed that the function γ(.) fulfills the Inada conditions, i.e. γ0(0) =∞, which
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ensures investment in the part of R&D that increases absorptive capacity (xai ),
and limxai→∞ γ
0(xai ) = 0.
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989), it is hypothesized that the appro-
priation of other firms’ research is realized through the interaction of spillovers
and absorptive capacity. A firm needs receiver competence to exploit knowl-
edge that spills out. But, a firm cannot assimilate what is not spilled out. The
fraction of knowledge becoming publicly accessible is referred to as the spillover
parameter θ. It is the degree to which the research effort of one firm spills out
and is potentially available to the other firm. The spillover parameter θ is as-
sumed to be exogenously given. It takes a value between zero and one. In the
extreme case of complete secrecy, where none of the knowledge produced in a
company leaks out, the spillover parameter θ would be equal to zero. At the
other extreme, the spillover parameter θ would take the value of one, if all of
the knowledge produced in a company flows out in the environment.
Firm i’s effective R&D expenditures zi are determined by the interaction
of R&D spillovers (θ) and its absorptive capacity (γ(xai )) as well as the own
and the rival’s expenditures on original research. Hence, firm i’s effective R&D
expenditures zi are represented by
zi = xoi + γ(x
a
i )θx
o
j i = 1, 2 i 6= j. (4)
Effective R&D expenditures zi reduce the unit-cost of production by the amount
of f(zi). As in the KMZ model, the function f(.) represents the knowledge
production function. It is necessary to stipulate a few assumptions on the
knowledge production function. It is quite natural to require that the maximum
possible cost reduction is less than the initial unit-cost of production, i.e. f(zi) <
c. In general, the knowledge production function f(.) has the same properties
as function γ(.), which represents absorptive capacity. It is assumed that f(.) is
twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave, i.e. f 0(zi) >
0 for all zi ≥ 0 and f 00(zi) < 0 for all zi ≥ 0. These assumptions are very general
and imply diminishing returns to R&D effort. By listing it as a stylized fact,
Dasgupta (1986) provides a rationale for this assumption. Furthermore, it is
supposed that if a firm’s effective R&D investment is zero, no cost reduction
is attainable, i.e. f(0) = 0. Additionally, the knowledge production function
f(.) has to fulfill the Inada conditions, i.e. f 0(0) =∞, which ensures that firms
invest in R&D, and limzi→∞ f
0(zi) = 0.
As mentioned above, both firms show the same constant unit-cost of pro-
duction c before investing in R&D. By carrying out R&D, a firm may achieve
a reduction of its production cost. Thus, firm i’s unit-cost of production after
investing in R&D (ci) is equal to the initial unit-cost of production (c) lessened
by the amount f(zi). The cost reduction is thus determined by firm i’s effective
R&D expenditures zi which are passed through function f(.).
ci = c− f(zi) i = 1, 2 (5)
Last but not least assume that
1 > 2c (6)
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which guarantees production at the second stage of the game described below.
The order of moves in the strategic investment game with endogenous spillover
is the following: At the first stage of the game firms simultaneously and non-
cooperatively choose their levels of R&D and how to split this amount be-
tween the two types of R&D. Hence, firms commit to R&D vectors (xai , x
o
i ) and
(xaj , x
o
j). Given these R&D vectors, firms simultaneously and non-cooperatively
decide how much they will produce at the game’s second stage.
Each firm chooses its profit maximizing level and mix of R&D, taking the
R&D vector of the other firm as given. Both firms anticipate the effect of
changes in their R&D investments on the knowledge level of their competitor.
Additionally, the effects of these changes on their own profit are taken into
account. The game is solved working backwards from the second stage to the
first, looking for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE). The analysis is
confined to symmetric strategy equilibria.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
Firm i’s second stage problem is to pick the quantity qi, taking the rival’s output
qj as given, so that its profit is maximized.
max
qi
Πi = [1−Q− c+ f(zi)]qi − (xai + xoi ) (7)
By differentiating this profit function with respect to the quantity qi and
setting the derivative equal to zero, firm i’s output reaction function is found.
Checking the second order condition ensures that a profit-maximum has been
calculated. Firm j behaves in an analogous way. The output reaction functions
are symmetric, as firms are identical. The intersection of the output reaction
functions constitutes the Cournot-Nash-equilibrium.
q∗i =
1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)
3
i = 1, 2 i 6= j (8)
Output reaction functions are linear and always cross ”correctly”. Consequently,
no problem with the stability of the equilibrium is to be expected at this stage.
Plugging the equilibrium output back into the profit function (7), profits can
be rewritten as
Π∗i =
1
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)]2 − (xai + xoi ) i = 1, 2 i 6= j (9)
or simply as Π∗i = (q
∗
i )
2 − (xai + xoi ). It can be observed that the more original
research firm i performs, the lower its production cost, which results in a higher
output. However, if θ > 0, firm i’s original research also reduces firm j’s cost
of production. Consequently, the spillover effect dampens firm i’s increase in
equilibrium output, though leaving the total effect unambiguous. An increase in
cost-reducing original research raises the output of that firm, i.e. ∂q
∗
i
∂xoi
> 0 (The
proof of this and the following results is contained in Appendix A). Whether
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firm j’s output increases or not depends on the level of the term θγ(xaj ). If it
exceeds the critical level of 0.5, the spillover effect will outweigh the effect of the
other firm being more competitive and firm j’s output will increase, i.e. ∂q
∗
j
∂xoi
≥ 0
iff θγ() ≥ 12 . The opposite holds for values of θγ(xaj ) which fall below that level:
Firm j’s output will decrease due to an increase in firm i’s original research,
i.e.
∂q∗j
∂xoi
≤ 0 iff θγ() ≤ 12 . Finally, aggregate industry output at the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium will rise in response to an increase of cost-reducing R&D, i.e.
∂Q∗
∂xoi
> 0. These results correspond to Suzumura’s (1992) findings. The other
question that arises is how individual and total output at the second stage of
the game react to a change in the amount invested to strengthen absorptive
capacity. For positive spillovers θ > 0, stepping up firm i’s expenditures to
improve absorptive capacity results in a higher equilibrium output on the part
of that firm, i.e. ∂q
∗
i
∂xai
≥ 0, whereas it decreases the other firm’s output, i.e.
∂q∗j
∂xai
≤ 0. As the effect on the own firm is stronger than the effect on the other
firm, an amelioration of a firm’s absorptive capacity leads to an increase in total
output, i.e. ∂Q
∗
∂xai
≥ 0.
Proceeding to the first stage of the game, firm i encounters the following
problem:
max
xai , x
o
i
Π∗i =
1
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)]2 − (xai + xoi ) (10)
It is assumed that firms only produce if they make a profit, i.e. (q∗i )
2 ≥ xai +xoi .
Due to the model specification (equations (1), (6) and f(zi) < c), it follows that
q∗i lies in the interval ]0,
1
2 [. Consequently, xi is bounded from above, xi <
1
4 ,
implying also, that xai and x
o
i are bounded from above.
The profit function is supposed to be strictly concave in xai and x
o
i (the
second order conditions are contained in Appendix B). The first order conditions
are given by:
∂Πi
∂xoi
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂xoi
− ∂f
∂zj
∂zj
∂xoi
]− 1 = 0
which reduces to
∂Πi
∂xoi
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2
∂f
∂zi
− ∂f
∂zj
θγ(xaj )]− 1 = 0 (11)
as
∂zi
∂xoi
= 1 and
∂zj
∂xoi
= θγ(xaj )
[1− c+2f(zi)−f(zj)] catches the quantity effect - the higher the quantity sold,
the higher is the profit. 2 ∂f∂zi represents the positive externality a firm’s effective
R&D exerts by reducing its marginal cost. The negative externality that the
firm’s R&D effort to produce original results has on its profits through reducing
the other firm’s marginal cost is represented by the term (− ∂f∂zj θγ(x
a
j )).
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∂Πi
∂xai
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂γ
∂γ
∂xai
]− 1 = 0
which reduces to
∂Πi
∂xai
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2θxoj
∂f
∂zi
∂γ
∂xai
]− 1 = 0 (12)
as
∂zi
∂γ
= θxoj
[1 − c + 2f(zi) − f(zj)] again catches the quantity effect, which is reinforced
by the positive externality of the other firm’s original research. The externally
available knowledge has a cost reducing effect depending on the firm’s absorptive
capacity and the value of the spillover parameter.
In the symmetric case (xai = x
a
j = x
a and xoi = x
o
j = x
o which implies
zi = zj = z) firm indices can be suppressed and first order conditions are:
∂Πi
∂xoi
|symm= 2
9
[1− c+ f(z)]∂f
∂z
[2− θγ(xa)]− 1 = 0 (13)
∂Πi
∂xai
|symm= 2
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[1− c+ f(z)][2θxo ∂f
∂z
∂γ
∂xa
]− 1 = 0 (14)
One can observe that equation (13) is similar to the KMZ case N, except for
the endogenous spillover. From the first order conditions it follows that
xo =
2− θγ(xa)
2θγ0(xa)
(15)
Equation (15) stipulates the optimal amount of original research as a function
of research devoted to improve absorptive capacity and the spillover parameter
θ. Partially differentiating xo with respect to θ yields
∂xo
∂θ
= − 1
θ2γ0
< 0.
Fixing absorptive capacity xa at a certain level, confirms the traditional result
- shown for example by Spence (1984) - that an increase in the spillover level
θ reduces the incentives to perform (original) R&D. However, in the endoge-
nous spillover case an increase in spillovers will raise the incentives to build up
absorptive capacity in order to tap the larger pool of external knowledge. Con-
sequently, totally differentiating the equilibrium condition (15) and equation
(13) with respect to xo, xa, and θ provides deeper insight.
{2θγ0(xa)}| {z }
F1
dxo+{2xoθγ00(xa) + θγ0(xa)}| {z }
F2
dxa+{2xoγ0(xa) + γ(xa)}| {z }
F3
dθ = 0 (16)
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{G1} dxo + {G2} dxa + {G3} dθ = 0 (17)
G1 = {[2− θγ(xa)][(∂f∂z )
2 ∂z
∂xo
] + [2− θγ(xa)][1− c+ f(z)]∂
2f
∂z2
∂z
∂xo
}
G2 = {[∂f∂z
∂z
∂γ
∂γ
∂xa
][2− θγ(xa)]∂f
∂z
+ [1− c+ f(z)][−θ ∂γ
∂xa
]
∂f
∂z
+
+ [1− c+ f(z)][2− θγ(xa)]∂
2f
∂z2
∂z
∂γ
∂γ
∂xa
}
G3 = {(∂f∂z )
2 ∂z
∂θ
[2− θγ(xa)] + [1− c+ f(z)][−γ(xa)]∂f
∂z
+
+ [1− c+ f(z)][2− θγ(xa)]∂
2f
∂z2
∂z
∂θ
}
Using the more convenient short notation, equations (16) and (17) can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
F1
dxo
dθ
+ F2
dxa
dθ
+ F3 = 0
G1
dxo
dθ
+G2
dxa
dθ
+G3 = 0
From the previous equations one can derive:
dxo
dθ
=
F2G3 − F3G2
F1G2 − F2G1
(18)
and
dxa
dθ
=
F3G1 − F1G3
F1G2 − F2G1
(19)
The following observations help to evaluate the signs of these differentials:
• F1 and F3 are always positive
• sign[F2] = sign[2xoγ00(xa) + γ0(xa)]
• sign[G1] = −1 (The proofs are contained in Appendix C)
• sign[G2] = −1
• sign[G3] = −1
It follows that the equilibrium amount of R&D invested in original research
decreases as the spillover increases, if F2 is negative:
dxo
dθ
< 0 if (2xoγ00(xa) + γ0(xa)) < 0
Note that F2 being negative is a sufficient condition for the result to hold.
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Proposition 1 If [2θ − γ] is log-convex, the equilibrium amount that is invested
in original research will decrease as the spillover θ increases.
It is shown in Appendix D that the numerator in equation (18) is always
positive. However, the sign of the denominator cannot be evaluated in a similar
way. Therefore, the result that the equilibrium amount of original research
decreases as the spillover increases hinges on the sufficient condition of F2 being
negative. If F2 is negative, the denominator (F1G2 − F2G1) in equation (18) is
negative and the numerator (F2G3−F3G2) is positive. To demand that [2θ − γ]
is log-convex would be the same as requiring F2 to be negative. Hence, [ 2θ − γ]
being log-convex is a sufficient condition for F1G2 − F2G1 to be negative (for
the proof please see Appendix E).
For the other component of R&D it follows that under certain conditions
the equilibrium amount of R&D invested in strengthening absorptive capacity
increases as the spillover increases:
dxa
dθ
> 0 if (a) (2xoγ00(xa) + γ0(xa)) < 0 and
(b) {(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+ f(.)]f 00(.)}xo[2 + θ2(γ(.))2]]
+ θγ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)] < 0
Proposition 2 If [ 2θ−γ] is log-convex and if function f(.) bends ”strong enough”
(such that condition (b) above is satisfied), the equilibrium amount of R&D that
is invested in improving absorptive capacity will increase as the spillover θ in-
creases.
If [ 2θ − γ] is log-convex, F2 is negative and the denominator in equation (19)
is negative. The numerator (F3G1 − F1G3) in equation (19) is negative if the
R&D production function f(.) bends strong enough, i.e. if {(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+
f(z)]f 00(.)} is large enough in absolute terms. To see how the above condition
(b) is derived, please refer to Appendix F.
The results of this model differ from the outcomes of the strategic invest-
ment games with exogenous spillover. The findings of the traditional literature
hinge on a ”free-rider effect”, which worsens the higher the exogenously given
spillover becomes. Consequently, the non-cooperative equilibrium amount of
R&D decreases as the spillover increases, possibly leading to underinvestment
in R&D. The socially insufficient R&D investment is, in turn, a frequently cited
argument for governmental intervention, which may for instance employ R&D
subsidies or encourage R&D cooperation.
In the present model however, the results are differentiated. A firm’s R&D
cannot automatically be replaced by another firm’s R&D. In order to learn
from its competitor, a company needs to develop its ”absorptive capacity”. In
contrast to the ”free-rider effect”, the ”absorptive capacity effect” increases the
amount of money put into R&D as the spillover rises! A higher spillover implies
a larger potential spillover pool. Firms will be more eager to tap into this pool.
Therefore, more funds are spent on the amelioration of absorptive capacity,
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because a higher absorptive capacity enables a firm to gain more knowledge
from the spillover pool. The ”absorptive capacity effect” may only emerge
in a model with endogenous spillovers. As a result, the ”free-rider” and the
”absorptive capacity effect” are working against each other. As can be seen
from the simulation example presented in the next section, the ”free-rider effect”
dominates the ”absorptive capacity effect”. An increase in spillovers leads to a
partial shift of R&D expenditures from the category xo to xa. Yet, the total
amount spent on R&D declines as the spillover θ rises. This result is due to the
model specification, in particular to equation (4): R&D that produces original
results (xo) enters the effective R&D equation directly, whereas R&D directed
at improving absorptive capacity (xa) exerts its influence only indirectly via
function γ(). The simulation example in the following section illustrates the
findings of this section.
4 Simulation Example
To run the numerical computations, a specific functional form for absorptive
capacity has to be adopted. To keep the function as simple as possible, I suggest
using one from the family
γ(xai ) =
µ
xai
1 + xai
¶ρ
0 < ρ < 1. (20)
This family of functions possesses all the characteristics stipulated in the
general setting of the model. It takes a value between zero and one, γ(0) = 0. It
is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave and it fulfills
the Inada conditions. The parameter ρ determines a firm’s efficiency in building
up its absorptive capacity. The higher (1 − ρ), the better a firm is in building
up receiver competence.
Moreover, a specific shape for the R&D production function f(.) has to be
selected. As function f(.) has essentially the same properties as function γ(.), I
suggest choosing the same functional form.
f(zi) = d
µ
zi
1 + zi
¶ρ
0 < ρ < 1, d < c.
Note that function f(.) has to meet equation (6) and f(zi) < c to obey
the model specification. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce parameter d.
The simulation results presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 were achieved using
”Mathematica”. The employed parameter values are ρ = 1/2, c = 1/4 and
d = 1/8.
The important outcome of this example are the qualitative results, which
confirm the previous theoretical findings. The amount of R&D which pro-
duces original results decreases as the spillover increases. In contrast to this,
the amount of R&D directed at improving absorptive capacity increases as the
11
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Spillover Θ
1  108
2  108
3  108
4  108
Optimal xa
Figure 1: Equilibrium amount of R&D directed at improving absorptive capacity
as a function of the spillover θ
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Spillover Θ0.0004363
0.00043635
0.0004364
0.00043645
Optimal xo
Figure 2: Equilibrium amount of original research as a function of θ
12
spillover increases. As can be seen from the scale on the y-axis, the ”free-rider
effect” outweighs the ”absorptive capacity effect”.
5 Conclusion
Beginning with Kamien and Zang (2000), industrial economists started to in-
corporate the absorptive capacity hypothesis in R&D games. More recent ap-
proaches stem for instance from Grünfeld (2003), Kaiser (2002) and Wiethaus
(2005). The common feature of these models is their complexity, which rises
to a level where it is hard to obtain an explicit analytic solution. Therefore,
results are frequently obtained by numerical simulations and the examination
of comparative static properties of the specific model.
Centered around Cohen and Levinthal’s (1989) hypothesis that R&D plays
a dual role as well as empirical evidence for the validity of their claim, this
paper endogenizes the spillover of a strategic investment game. In the present
framework, it is distinguished between two components of R&D: one sort that
produces original results and another type that aims at improving a firm’s ab-
sorptive capacity. This partition might be interpreted along the often drawn
distinction between basic research and applied research and constitutes the dis-
tinctive feature of the model on hand.
The main result of this paper is that as the R&D spillover rises, firms invest
more money in improving absorptive capacity and less in R&D that generates
original results. An increasing spillover induces companies to switch from a
do-it-yourself strategy to a strategy of copying-from-others. These findings are
derived on a theoretical basis by a comparative static analysis. Numerical sim-
ulations further illustrate these results.
To sum up, the outcome of this model is not fully in line with those of
the ”traditional literature” on strategic investment games. In an endogenous
spillover setting spillovers may also encourage R&D. By strengthening their own
receiver competence, externally available knowledge can be more easily put to
use. This finding adds a new perspective to the discussion of the desirability of
RJVs. Grünfeld (2003) showed that for the same spillover rate the equilibrium
R&D investment in the absorptive capacity game is always higher than in a
game without absorptive capacity effects. Consequently, the critical spillover
rate is higher in the absorptive capacity game. Compared to the traditional
models, the desirability of an RJV would be restricted to a smaller range of
high spillovers.
For economic policy formulation it is of utmost importance to examine the
effects of R&D spillovers and absorptive capacity on the firm’s innovation de-
cisions and on productivity. In this context it is crucial whether spillovers
complement or substitute a firm’s own R&D. Still the number of open questions
in the domain of strategic investment games with endogenous spillover is legion.
Other model specifications could be employed and the possibility of asymmet-
ric equilibria be examined. In the context of the present model, one could try
to relax assumptions such as linear inverse demand or the Inada-conditions on
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functions γ() and f(). Empirical results are also rather scarce. I therefore think
that R&D games with endogenous absorptive capacity are a promising field for
further research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A
∂q∗i
∂xoi
> 0,
∂q∗j
∂xoi
≥ 0 iff θγ() ≥ 1
2
,
∂q∗j
∂xoi
≤ 0 iff θγ() ≤ 1
2
,
∂Q∗
∂xoi
> 0
Proofs: (using the symmetry property of xo)
∂q∗i
∂xoi
= 23
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂xoi
− 13
∂f
∂zj
∂zj
∂xoi
= 13f
0[2− θγ] > 0
∂q∗j
∂xoi
= 23
∂f
∂zj
∂zj
∂xoi
− 13
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂xoi
= 13f
0[2θγ − 1]
Q∗ = q∗i + q
∗
j =
1−c+2f(zi)−f(zj)
3 +
1−c+2f(zj)−f(zi)
3 =
2(1−c)+f(zi)+f(zj)
3
∂Q∗
∂xoi
= 13
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂xoi
+ 13
∂f
∂zj
∂zj
∂xoi
= 13f
0[1 + θγ()]
∂q∗i
∂xai
≥ 0,
∂q∗j
∂xai
≤ 0, ∂Q
∗
∂xai
≥ 0
Proofs: (using the symmetry property of xo)
∂q∗i
∂xai
= 23
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂γ
∂γ
∂xai
= 23f
0γ0θxo ≥ 0
∂q∗j
∂xai
= −13
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂γ
∂γ
∂xai
= −13f 0γ0θxo ≤ 0
∂Q∗
∂xai
= 13
∂f
∂zi
∂zi
∂γ
∂γ
∂xai
= 13f
0γ0θxo ≥ 0
6.2 Appendix B
Second order conditions for the first stage maximization problem
∂2Πi
∂(xoi )2
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)]{2∂
2f
∂z2i
−
− ∂
2f
∂z2j
θ2γ2(xaj )}+
2
9
[2
∂f
∂zi
− ∂f
∂zj
θγ(xaj )]
2
∂2Πi
∂(xai )2
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2θ2(xoj)2
∂2f
∂z2i
(
∂γ
∂xai
)2+
+ 2θxoj
∂f
∂zi
∂2γ
∂(xai )2
] +
2
9
[2θxoj
∂f
∂zi
∂γ
∂xai
]2
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∂2Πi
∂xai ∂x
o
i
=
∂2Πi
∂xoi ∂x
a
i
=
=
2
9
[1− c+ 2f(zi)− f(zj)][2θxoj
∂2f
∂z2i
∂γ
∂xai
]+
+
2
9
[2
∂f
∂zi
− ∂f
∂zj
θγ(xaj )][2θx
o
j
∂f
∂zi
∂γ
∂xai
]
If ∂
2Πi
∂(xoi )2
< 0, ∂
2Πi
∂(xai )2
< 0 and ∂
2Πi
∂(xoi )2
× ∂2Πi∂(xai )2 > (
∂2Πi
∂xai ∂x
o
i
)2, the assumption that
the profit function is strictly concave in xoi and x
a
i is satisfied.
Second order conditions in the symmetric case:
∂2Πi
∂(xoi )2
|symm= 2
9
(1− c+ f)f 00(2− θ2γ2) + 2
9
(f 0)2(2− θγ)2
∂2Πi
∂(xai )2
|symm= 2
9
(1− c+ f)][2θ2(xo)2f 00(γ0)2 + 2θxof 0γ00] + 2
9
[2θxof 0γ0]2
∂2Πi
∂xai ∂x
o
i
|symm= ∂
2Πi
∂xoi ∂x
a
i
|symm= 2
9
[1−c+f ][2θxof 00γ0]+ 2
9
(f 0)2[2−θγ][2θxoγ0]
In the symmetric case the assumption that the profit function is strictly
concave in xo and xa is satisfied if it holds that:
(1− c+ f)f 00(2− θ2γ2) + (f 0)2(2− θγ)2 < 0
(1− c+ f)][θxof 00(γ0)2 + f 0γ00] + 2θxo(f 0)2(γ0)2 < 0
and
f 0γ00{(1−c+f)f 00(2−θ2γ2)+(2−θγ)2(f 0)2}−θ3xoγ2(γ0)2f 00{(1−c+f)f 00+(f 0)2} > 0
6.3 Appendix C
Proof: sign[G1] = -1:
sign[G1] = sign[(∂f∂z )
2 + [1− c+ f(z)]∂
2f
∂z2 ]
From SOCs in the symmetric case we know:
[1− c+ f(z)]∂
2f
∂z2 [2− θ2γ2(xa)] + (
∂f
∂zi
)2[2− θγ(xa)]2 < 0
As [2−θ
2γ2(xa)]
[2−θγ(xa)]2 ≤ 1 it follows that
[1− c+ f(z)]∂
2f
∂z2 + (
∂f
∂zi
)2 < 0
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Proof: sign[G2] = -1
Rearranging terms yields:
G2 = ∂γ∂xa {G1 θx
o
1+θγ(xa) − θ
∂f
∂z [1− c+ f(z)]}
Thus, sign[G2] = −1
Proof: sign[G3] = -1:
Comparing terms G3 can be rewritten as:
G3 = G1
γ(xa)xo
1+θγ(xa) − γ(xa)
∂f
∂z [1− c+ f(z)]
Thus, sign[G3] = −1
6.4 Appendix D
The numerator in equation (18) is always positive:
(Proof by contradiction) Writing out (F2G3−F3G2) using the shorter notation
introduced in the proofs above yields:
θ{2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)}γ(.){G1 xo1+θγ(.) − f 0(.)[1− c+ f(z)]}−
−{2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)}γ0(.)θ{G1 xo1+θγ(.) − f 0(.)[1− c+ f(z)]} ≤ 0
When cancelling, the inequality sign changes as we divide by a negative number:
{2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)}γ(.)− {2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)}γ0(.) ≥ 0
2xoγ
00
(.)γ(.) + γ0(.)γ(.)− 2xo(γ0(.))2 − γ(.)γ0(.) ≥ 0
2xoγ
00
(.)γ(.)− 2xo(γ0(.))2 ≥ 0
2xo{γ00(.)γ(.)− (γ0(.))2} ≥ 0
γ
00
(.)γ(.)− (γ0(.))2 ≥ 0 which is a contradiction!
Thus, (F2G3 − F3G2) must be positive.
6.5 Appendix E
[ 2θ − γ] being log-convex is a sufficient condition for F1G2 − F2G1 to be
negative:
Proof: Writing out F1G2 − F2G1 using the notation introduced above yields:
2θ2(γ0(.))2{G1 xo1+θγ(.) − f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)]}− θ{2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)}G1 < 0
Divide by θ :
2θ(γ0(.))2{G1 xo1+θγ(.) − f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)]}− {2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)}G1 < 0
Regroup the terms:
G1{2θ(γ0(.))2 xo1+θγ(.) − 2xoγ00(.)− γ0(.)}− 2θ(γ0(.))2f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)] < 0
As G1 and {−2θ(γ0(.))2f 0(.)[1−c+f(.)]} are negative, a sufficient condition for
the above inequality to hold is:
(2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)) < 0, because then
−2xoγ00(.)− γ0(.)) > 0 and consequently
{2θ(γ0(.))2 xo1+θγ(.) − 2xoγ00(.)− γ0(.)} > 0.
Requiring (2xoγ00(.) + γ0(.)) < 0 is equivalent to demanding [ 2θ − γ] being log-
convex:
Plugging in for xo and multiplying with γ0(.) yields:
16
2−θγ()
θ γ
00(.) + γ0(.)2 < 0 or
[ 2θ − γ()]γ00(.) + γ0(.)2 < 0
F is log convex ⇐⇒ log F is convex
F (xa) = [2θ − γ(xa)]
F 0(xa) = −γ0(xa)
F 00(xa) = −γ00(xa)
[log F (xa)]0 = F
0(xa)
F (xa) < 0
[log F (xa)]00=F
00(xa)F (xa)−[F 0(xa)]2
[F (xa)]2 > 0 if F
00(xa)F (xa)− [F 0(xa)]2 > 0
6.6 Appendix F
Simplify expression F3G1 − F1G3 =
= {2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)}G1 − 2θγ0(.){G1 γ(.)x
o
1+θγ(.) − γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)]} =
Rearranging terms yields:
= G1{2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)− 2θγ0(.) γ(.)x
o
1+θγ(.)}+ 2θγ0(.)γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)] =
Plug in for G1 :
= {2− θγ(.)}{1 + θγ(.)}{(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+ f(.)]f 00(.)}
{2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)− 2θγ0(.) γ(.)xo(1+θγ(.))}+ 2θγ0(.)γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)] =
= {2− θγ(.)}{(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+ f(.)]f 00(.)}{[2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)][1 + θγ(.)]−
−2θγ0(.)γ(.)xo}+ 2θγ0(.)γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)]
Simplify the following expression:
{2− θγ(.)}{[2xoγ0(.) + γ(.)][1 + θγ(.)]− 2θγ0(.)γ(.)xo} =
= {2− θγ(.)}{2xoγ0(.) + γ(.) + θ(γ(.))2} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + 2γ(.) + 2θ(γ(.))2 − 2xoγ0(.)θγ(.)− θ(γ(.))2 − θ2(γ(.))3} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + 2γ(.) + θ(γ(.))2 − (2− θγ(.))γ(.)− θ2(γ(.))3} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + 2γ(.) + θ(γ(.))2 − 2γ(.) + θ(γ(.))2 − θ2(γ(.))3} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + 2θ(γ(.))2 − θ2(γ(.))3} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + θ(γ(.))2[2− θγ(.)} =
= {4xoγ0(.) + 2θ2(γ(.))2xoγ0(.)}
Use the simplified expression to continue:
F3G1 − F1G3 =
= {(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+ f(.)]f 00(.)}{4xoγ0(.) + 2θ2(γ(.))2xoγ0(.)}+
+2θγ0(.)γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)] =
= {[(f 0(.))2 + [1− c+ f(.)]f 00(.)][2xoγ0(.)[2 + θ2(γ(.))2]]}+
+2θγ0(.)γ(.)f 0(.)[1− c+ f(.)]
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